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I. INTRODUCTION
There are common held beliefs that serve as cornerstones of the
American justice system. These principles include the right to counsel, the
presumption of innocence, the protection from double jeopardy, and the
prohibition of self-incrimination. Another fundamental belief is that
everyone should have access to justice regardless of how or where they
pursue a lawsuit. The right to access justice has been operationalized by
the procedural rules regarding pleading a complaint. Until approximately
ten years ago, the long-held standard of notice pleading guaranteed that
everyone could have his or her day in court. However, with the Twombly 1
and Iqbal 2 (together commonly referred to as Twiqbal) decisions, the
Supreme Court of the United States changed the pleading requirements
for federal suits from notice to plausibility pleading. And while
practitioners and academics disagree about the impact of this change,
there is no doubt about the confusion it has created in the state courts.
Civil procedure, which can be complicated for practitioners let alone pro
se litigants, “will become even more byzantine, unpredictable, and local”
due to this change. 3 This Article considers the impact of plausibility
pleading on the fundamental right of access to the courts, using the Ohio
state court system as a case study.
Section II briefly outlines the fundamental nature of the American
right to access justice through the court system. Section III summarizes
the objectives of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the way in
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly), 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 566 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between Federal
and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 123 (2010).
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which the Rules are amended, and the development of replica jurisdictions
among the state courts. Next, Section IV revisits the long-held notice
pleading standard as explained in Conley v. Gibson 4 and the eventual
move towards plausibility pleading made in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly 5 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 6 The federal shift to plausibility pleading
has started to trickle down into various state court systems. Section V
summarizes the current status of the replica (and related) jurisdictions on
this issue and compares the way three statesColorado, Minnesota, and
Tennesseehave dealt with the issue. The development of the Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure (ORCP), the Ohio Rules’ intentional focus on just
results, the ways in which the Ohio Rules are amended, and the muddled
situation developing in the Ohio district courts is covered in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII enumerates the reasons why Ohio should remain
committed to a liberal notice pleading standard in order to ensure access
to justice via the courts.
II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE VIA THE COURTS
A.

Access to Justice is a Constitutional Right

One of the most basic and fundamental of our rights is the access to
justice. For the founding fathers there was no right more essential, seen
by “access to justice provisions appear[ing] in many of the original
Thirteen Colonies” founding documents. 7 However, when the
Constitution was written, this assumed right was not explicitly included.
One of the purposes of the Ninth Amendment was to address this issue—
to include those undeniably guaranteed rights that had not been
enumerated. 8 Justice Scalia, at the 40th anniversary celebration of the
Legal Services Corporation 9 pointed out, “the pledge of allegiance itself
says ‘Liberty and justice for all’ . . . Can there be a just society when some
do not have justice?” 10 If access to justice is indeed this foundational of a
right, then how is it guaranteed to the citizens of this country? Every right
4. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
5. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
6. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662.
7. Leonard W. Schroeter, The Jurisprudence of Access to Justice: From Magna Carta to
Romer v. Evans via Marbury v. Madison (1996), http://www.seanet.com/~rod/marbury.html
[https://perma.cc/UT66-BRR9].
8. Id.
SERVICES
CORP.,
https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc
9. About
LSC,
LEGAL
[https://perma.cc/DB44-HBNA] (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
10. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, OHIO SUPREME COURT
ACCESS TO JUSTICE REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS at 2 (2015).
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“requires a capability of securing a remedy . . . Thus, rights cannot exist
and have meaning if the system cannot be accessed. . . .” 11
B.

Access to the Courts Procedurally Guarantees the Constitutional
Right to Justice

Historically, the constitutional right to justice has been achieved via
the procedural right to access the court system. In modern times, courts
have held that the right to access the courts is basic to our system of
governance and protected by the Constitution. 12 This right must be
“adequate, effective and meaningful and . . . [the] interference with right
of access to the courts gives rise to claims for relief under the civil rights
statutes.” 13 The very stability of American society depends on the ability
of the people to access the court system in order to resolve disputes in a
non-violent and civilized manner. 14
Several states, including Ohio, have commissioned task forces to
identify gaps in and obstacles to accessing the civil court system. In 2015,
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor appointed the Task Force on Access to
Justice (Taskforce) to do just this for the state of Ohio. 15 Chief Justice
O’Connor identified access to justice as a priority in Ohio and stated: “It
is imperative that the bench and the bar work together in these difficult
financial times to maintain access to justice.” 16
The Task Force was chaired by former Ohio Supreme Court Justice
Yvette McGee Brown and included ten other judges, attorneys, and legal
advocates. 17 The group met five times during the course of its
deliberations, methodically addressing the directive issued by Chief
Justice O’Connor. 18 After studying the situation in Ohio and the efforts
made in other states, the Task Force made eleven specific
recommendations, 19 two of which are of particular relevance to this
11. Schroeter, supra note 7.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Robert J. Grey, Jr., Access to the Courts: Equal Justice for All, INT’L INFO. PROGRAM
ELEC. J. (Aug. 2004), https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/gov/ijde0804.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACR7REJ2]
15. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 10, at 2.
16. Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, Speech at Opening Courtroom Doors: Access to Justice
in
Ohio
(Feb.
22,
2013),
available
at
The
Supreme
Court
of
Ohio,
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/Speeches/2013/accessJustice.asp [https://perma.cc/Z7DP6265].
17. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 10, at 3.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 14-35. Taskforce recommendations include: (1) General Revenue Appropriation for
Civil Legal Aid in Ohio, (2) Pro Hac Vice Funding for Legal Services, (3) Implement an Add-On Fee
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Article. The Task Force called for the Supreme Court to create an Access
to Justice Director position. 20 The Director would be responsible for
assessing, coordinating, and directing statewide access to justice efforts,
which would help ensure a sustained commitment to the effort. 21 The
creation of a full-time position responsible for maintaining the state’s
focus on access to justice is evidence of just how important and
fundamental a right this is, especially in Ohio. The Task Force also called
for the development of an Access to Justice Impact Statement that would
be researched and written by the Director and filed any time an
amendment to the Ohio Rules of Court is proposed. 22 Much like the fiscal
impact statements that are required for every proposed bill to the Ohio
General Assembly, this statement would address:
• the likely number of Ohioans impacted by the proposed
change;
• whether the change will increase or decrease access to
Ohio’s courts for low-income Ohioans;
• what impact the proposed change will have on Ohio’s
minority populations’ access to the courts;
• and, what impact, if any, the proposed change will have on
the ability of Ohioans with limited English proficiency to
access justice. 23
In addition to the provisions for the rule-making process in Ohio, the
Access to Justice Impact Statement would allow the Director to request
information and consult with governmental bodies and related legal
organizations that serve these populations. 24 This way the Court will have
the most complete information possible as to the effect of a proposed rule
change prior to consideration. 25 As the creation of this Taskforce and the
resulting report demonstrate, access to the courts is a priority in Ohio,
which makes it especially important for Ohio to clarify its commitment to
notice pleading as discussed later in this Article.

for Attorney Registration, (4) Create a Supreme Court Access to Justice Director Position, (5)
Development of an Access to Justice Impact Statement, (6) Technology, (7) Self-Help Centers, (8)
Limited-Scope Representation, (9) Revising Ohio’s License Requirements in Support of Military
Spouse Attorneys, (10) Emeritus Rule, and (11) Forms.
20. Id. at 22.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 24-25.
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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III. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A.

Development and Objectives of the FRCP

The Rules Enabling Act was signed on June 19, 1934 and gave the
Supreme Court of the United States the opportunity and authority to
develop a comprehensive set of procedural court rules for federal civil
actions. 26 This legislation marked the beginning of an effort to create an
organized approach to federal judicial administration and also intended to
provide a model for the state civil court systems, many of which had
difficulties with the excessive technicalities of code pleading. 27 When
considering the role of the complaint in the development of the FRCP, the
Court recognized the need for a uniform pleading standard given the
inconsistent ways the state jurisdictions had historically approached the
topic. 28 This uniformity is especially important because the federal court’s
approach to pleadings was determined by the state in which that federal
court was sitting. 29 Over the next couple of decades, more than half of the
states adopted the FRCP and many others were heavily influenced by
these new procedures. 30
The FRCP intentionally moved away from code pleading towards
notice pleading. This new liberal approach to pleading only required that
the plaintiff provide a “short and plain statement” of the claim. 31 The
identification of evidence and the factual development of the case moved
to the discovery process. 32 This new approach to pleading increased
litigant access to the judicial process and ultimately justice. This shift to
a liberal pleading standard illustrated the FRCP’s emphasis on equity
rather than technical expertise in the administration of justice. Notice
pleading was later adopted by many of the states and has become a part
of our cultural understanding of the courts. 33
26. Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure – I. The Background,
44 YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1935); see 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2071-2077 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-164).
27. John P. Sullivan, Do the New Pleading Standards Set Out in Twombly and Iqbal Meet the
Needs of the Replica Jurisdictions?, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 57 (2010). Code pleading was the
process of alleging a very specific set of facts. It served to create a significant hurdle for plaintiffs to
have to overcome in order to proceed with a claim. Alana Jochum, Note, Pleading in Ohio After Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Why Ohio Shouldn’t “Notice” a Change, 58 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 495, 498 (2010).
28. Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure – II. Pleadings and
Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1299 (1935).
29. Id.
30. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 57.
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
32. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 57.
33. See infra Section VI.A.
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Amending the FRCP

Congress created the Judicial Conference in 1922 with the objective
of producing guidelines for the administration of courts in the United
States. 34 The Rules of Practice and Procedure subcommittee of the
Judicial Conference is responsible for drafting proposed amendments to
the FRCP, which is made up of federal judges, lawyers, state justices, and
representatives from the Department of Justice. 35 The processwhich
includes committee drafting, periods for public comments, hearings, and
an associated reportis structured to allow for ample consideration and
public feedback of the amendments and possible implications for the court
system. 36 Once the proposed amendments are finalized they are forwarded
to the Supreme Court who must approve and forward to Congress. 37 If
Congress does not take action to reject or modify the proposed
amendments, they take effect. 38
Needless to say, this process is thorough and deliberate, and
amendments to the FRCP do not happen based on isolated concerns or
specific cases. The process allows change over time without sudden shifts,
which create confusion and conflict as we have seen with the Supreme
Court’s rulings in Twombly 39 and Iqbal. 40 If the Supreme Court had
significant concerns about notice pleading as outlined in the FRCP, the
appropriate response would have been to utilize the established
procedures outlined above and “not to raise the pleading standard through
a judicial opinion.” 41 The Judicial Conference is designed for this exact
purpose by gathering a wide range of feedback and perspectives
concerning topics of such importance as changing citizen access to the
courts. 42

34. Federal Court Rules Research Guide, GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY (May 31, 2016, 11:31
AM), http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=320799&p=2146449 [https://perma.cc/6FLA-YDE8].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
40. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662 (2009).
41. William Funk et al., Plausibility Pleading: Barring the Courthouse Door to Deserving
FOR
PROGRESSIVE
REFORM,
14
(May
2010),
Claimants,
CTR.
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Twombly_1005.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N8N-JPJB].
42. Id.
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Replica Jurisdictions

Replica jurisdictions are state court systems that chose to adopt the
FRCP for their respective state systems, and then rely on federal court
interpretation of the FRCP as instructive to their own interpretation of
state rules of civil procedure.43 After the adoption of the FRCP, it was
hoped that the state court systems would follow suit. 44 Initially, this
seemed to be the case with the creation of 23 replica jurisdictions by 1975
and many others that closely patterned their civil rules after the FRCP.45
This uniformity in civil rules across the state court systems was intended
to make it easier for litigants to pursue cases either locally or federally as
well as focus attention on the merits of the case rather than the procedural
variation that existed across jurisdictions. 46 However, this effort was
stalled in the 1980’s for several reasons: 47 (i) federal judges started to rely
more on local rules; 48 (ii) interest groups began to lobby rulemakers trying
to create procedural advantages for their particular perspectives; 49 (iii)
state court systems began to assert their inherent rulemaking power as a
demonstration of a resurgence of state government authority; 50 and (iv)
the Twiqbal decisions further challenged the importance of procedural
uniformity by changing the direction of the FRCP and effectively making
it much more difficult for true replica jurisdictions to exist without similar
changes in all of those jurisdictions.51
Before the Twiqbal cases, there were 23 “replica” jurisdictions. 52
Another four jurisdictions had similar rules but they were established in
statutory codes. 53 And lastly, three additional jurisdictions were very
similar to the FRCP without being identical. 54 In total, there were 29 state
43. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State Courts After Twombly and Iqbal, POUND CIVIL
JUSTICE INST. 2010 FORUM FOR STATE APPELLATE COURT JUDGES (July 1, 2010),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2038349 [https://perma.cc/3FGF-3Z8P].
44. Michalski, supra note 3, at 112.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id at 113-14.
51. Id.
52. Replica jurisdictions include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377 (1986).
53. These jurisdictions include: Georgia, Kansas, Oklahoma, and North Carolina. See id. at
1378.
54. These jurisdictions include: Idaho, Mississippi, and Nevada. See id. at 1377.
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jurisdictions in addition to the District of Columbia that had rules
mirroring the language of FRCP 8, which became subject to
reinterpretation due to the Twiqbal decisions. 55 In other words, rather than
following the rule amendment process outlined above, which would have
provided ample time and opportunity for the legal community to consider
the impact of a change in pleading requirements, the Supreme Court
changed the interpretation of the FRCP with these two isolated cases. This
reinterpretation then created a dilemma for the replica jurisdictions.
Should they follow the federal move toward plausibility pleading or
remain committed to notice pleading? It is important to note that Supreme
Court decisions, while persuasive, are not binding in the state court
system. However, the courts in these jurisdictions have historically looked
to Supreme Court decisions to inform the application of their own rules
given their similarity in structure and substance. This adds to the
complexity of the situation and the confusion Twiqbal has created.
IV. NOTICE PLEADING AND THE ROAD TO PLAUSIBILITY
Notice Pleading: Conley v. Gibson

A.

After the FRCP were enacted in 1938, the Supreme Court clearly
outlined the requirements for notice pleading in Conley v Gibson. 56 In
Conley, a group of African-American employees of the Texas and New
Orleans Railroad filed a class action suit against Local Union No. 28 under
the Railway Labor Act for failing to advocate for them when the railroad
claimed to eliminate their jobs only to later fill them with white
employees. 57 The suit was pursued in federal court. The union moved and
the court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted as outlined in FRCP 8(a). 58 Even though the district court
did not provide much reasoning for the dismissal, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District affirmed the decision and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 59
In reversing the decision, the Supreme Court outlined the
requirements for a claim to survive a 12(b)(6) Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. 60 Unlike the old code pleading system, a complaint did not

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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need to set out detailed factual allegations. 61 The complaint must only
make “a short and plain statement of the claim.” 62 As long as the claim
provided enough information to give notice to the defendant about the
grounds upon which it rests, the claim would be sufficient. 63 The court
then went on to indicate that this liberal pleading standard was based on
the idea that pleading should not be based on technical skills but rather
allow claims to progress and be judged based on their merits. 64 A claim
should not be dismissed unless “it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” 65 Other devices, such as discovery, should be used to flesh out
factual details of the suit. 66 This decision solidified the intent of FRCP,
which was to insure that every claimant could access justice via the courts
as long as the complaint met these minimum standards. Similarly, many
state courts, especially replica jurisdictions, cite to Conley to inform their
pleading standards. 67
B.

The Birth of Plausibility Pleading: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

Notice pleading became the assumed standard for the American legal
system, so much so that the legal community was not expecting the
dramatic shift that would occur some 50 years later in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly. 68 In fact, Justice Stevens remarked in his dissent of Twombly,
“today’s opinion is the first by any Member of this Court to express any
doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation.” 69 In Twombly, the
plaintiffs represented a class of subscribers of local telephone and internet
service who claimed violation of the Sherman Act by the Incumbent Local
61. Id. at 47.
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
63. Id.
64. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 48 (1957).
65. Id. at 45-46.
66. Id. at 47-48.
67. See Wackerli v. Martindale, 353 P.2d 782 (Idaho 1960); Mills v. Orcas Power & Light Co.,
355 P.2d 781 (Wash. 1960); Long v. Ariz. Portland Cement Co., 362 P.2d 741 (Ariz. 1961); Midkiff
v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 368 P.2d 887 (Haw. 1962); Sprott v. Roberts, 390 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1964);
Spaberg v. Johnson, 392 P.2d 78 (Mont. 1964); Hambaugh v. Peoples, 401 P.2d 777 (N.M. 1965);
Voisin v. Luke, 191 So. 2d 503 (La. 1966); Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers, 227 A.2d 582 (R.I. 1967);
Shannon v. Anchorage, 429 P.2d 17 (Alaska 1967); Richards v. Ellis, 233 A.2d 37 (Me. 1967);
Residential Dev., Inc. v. Mann, 169 S.E.2d 305 (Ga. 1969); Pride v. Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa
1970); Sutton v. Duke, 176 S.E.2d 161 (N.C. 1970); Forks v. Warsaw, 273 N.E.2d 856 (Ind. 1971);
People ex rel. Willis v. Dep’t of Corr., 282 N.E.2d 716 (Ill. 1972); Brown v. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc.,
277 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1973); Baker v. Rangos, 324 A.2d 498 (Pa. 1974); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete
Corp., 326 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1975).
68. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 578.
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Exchange Carriers (ILECs). 70 The Sherman Act prohibited any kind of
contract or agreement in restraint of trade or commerce between the
states. 71 The plaintiffs accused the ILECs that were created by the breakup of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company’s (AT&T) local
telephone business, of such collusion. 72 The ILECs were supposed to
share their networks with other local exchange carriers to promote
competition in the market. 73 Instead, the plaintiffs asserted that the ILECs
agreed not to enter each other’s territory as demonstrated by their parallel
conduct, which in turn prohibited the growth of new upstart companies. 74
The defendants asserted that the parallel conduct was not
coordinated, but rather coincidental. 75 The district court agreed and
granted the motion concluding that the plaintiffs must “allege additional
facts tending to exclude independent self-interested conduct as an
explanation for the parallel actions.” 76 When appealed, the Second Circuit
reversed the decision and found that the liberal notice pleading standard
of FRCP 8 had been met and that the district court had used the wrong
standard. 77 It held that “plus factors are not required to be pleaded to
permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive dismissal.” 78
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address the proper standard
needed when pleading parallel conduct in an antitrust case. 79
The Court went on to recite the notice pleading standard in Conley,
but then added additional requirements, in effect changing the pleading
standard required to survive dismissal. The Court stated that “the pleading
must contain something more” than a set of facts that suggested there had
been coordinated, deceptive action on the part of the ILECs. 80 An
allegation of parallel conduct as evidence of an antitrust violation “gets
the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual
enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility. . . .” 81 Thus the plausibility pleading standard was born.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
2004)).
81.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

Id. at 544.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 555 (quoting Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure sec. 1216 (3d ed.
Id. at 557.

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 12

962

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:951

As outlined in detail in Justice Stevens’ dissent, the Court acted in
direct contradiction to the liberal pleading standard of the FRCP, which
wished to keep litigants in the court so that the merits of a claim could be
assessed during other pretrial processes or trial itself if appropriate.82
Justice Stevens went on to quote Charles E. Clark, the principal author of
the FRCP, who explained that the purpose of a liberal pleading standard
was to simply “[distinguish] the case from all others, so that the manner
and form of trial and remedy expected are clear” not to demonstrate proof
of the case. 83 Justice Stevens then returned to the language of Conley and
reminded the Court that a complaint should not be dismissed unless “it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”84 Matters of evidence were
to be left to other phases of the trial process under the FRCP. He went
even further to suggest that the majority had mistakenly used the
heightened summary judgment burden rather than the appropriate
pleading burden required for allegations of an illegal conspiracy, as
outlined in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 85 In
summation, Justice Stevens pointed out: “[T]hree important sources of
law—the Sherman Act, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—all point unmistakably in the same
direction, yet the Court marche[d] resolutely the other way.” 86
C.

The Growth of Plausibility Pleading: Ashcroft v. Iqbal

Commentators, surprised by and critical of the Court’s new
“plausibility” pleading standard as outlined in Twombly 87 hoped that the
new standard would only apply to antitrust cases. Two years later in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which involved a Bivens action, the Court indicated
otherwise. 88 Iqbal, the plaintiff who was Pakistani and Muslim, was
arrested just after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 89 After arrest,
Iqbal claimed he was subjected to harsh conditions, by being confined due
82. Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (quoting Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase—
Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J.
976, 977 (1937)).
84. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957)).
85. Id. at 585-86 (citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986)).
86. Id. at 596.
87. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
88. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662 (2009).
89. Id. at 666.
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to his religion and ethnic identification. 90 The plaintiff asserted these
claims against numerous people including John Ashcroft, former Attorney
General, and Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI, and asserted that these
two individuals knew of and adopted this unconstitutional policy. 91 The
defendants moved to dismiss the suit claiming the complaint was not
sufficient and based on mere speculation. 92 The district court denied the
motion to dismiss and the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, but the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial
of the motion and found that Iqbal’s complaint was adequate to proceed. 93
Upon review, the Supreme Court cited the Twombly decision
establishing plausibility pleading and reversed the appellate court’s
decision finding that Iqbal’s claim was not sufficient. 94 The Court then
outlined a new two-pronged approach to reviewing complaints. 95 First,
although the Court must accept as true all factual allegations made in a
complaint, this presumption did not apply to mere legal conclusions that
were asserted in a complaint.96 Secondly, only complaints that stated a
plausible claim survived a motion to dismiss. 97 The Court held that Iqbal’s
complaint did not meet this plausibility standard and reversed the lower
court’s decision. 98
Iqbal confirmed that plausibility pleading was here to stay, but the
Court was divided. 99 Justice Souter, who wrote the Twombly majority
opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
dissented not only to the pleading standard used but also to the conclusion
that Iqbal’s complaint would not meet the heightened plausibility pleading
standard. 100 “Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss
stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true . . . [A]
court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court
may be.” 101 Justice Souter further explained that the only exceptions to
this presumption were those that were “sufficiently fantastic to defy
reality” like claims of “little green men.” 102 Justice Breyer, in his own
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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dissent, challenged the idea that a change in pleading standard was
necessary due to the impact of unwarranted litigation on the efficient
operation of the courts. 103 Just as the Second Circuit explained, Justice
Breyer believed there were plenty of other ways for the courts to deal with
this issue rather than taking such a drastic measure as changing the
pleading standard. 104 There was no evidence to believe that these other
case management tools were not adequate. 105
In the ten years since the Twiqbal cases there have been countless
court opinions, journal articles, blog posts, and academic debates
regarding the impact of these decisions. Most federal courts have followed
suit and transitioned to the plausibility standard even though the FRCP
have not been amended. 106
This reinterpretation of the federal pleading standard has created a
dilemma for the replica state jurisdictions that historically have utilized
Supreme Court decisions to interpret their own rules. Should the state
courts follow suit and significantly change the pleading standards in their
own local systems based on two Supreme Court cases, essentially
ignoring the rulemaking and amending procedures outlined in their
jurisdictions? How would this fundamental change affect the public’s
access to justice in the state court systems, which handles significantly
more civil suits as compared with the federal court system? A change to
the pleading standard in the state courts carries with it even greater
implications for the access to justice, if for no other reason than the
number of litigants involved.
V. PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING AND STATE COURT SYSTEMS
A.

The Current “State” of Affairs, Ten Years After Twiqbal

In the ten years that have passed since the Twiqbal decisions,
plausibility pleading has begun to creep into the state court systems. As
already mentioned, the Twiqbal decisions invited re-interpretation of the
notice pleading standard that had been embraced by replica jurisdictions.
Of those 30 jurisdictions, 12 state supreme courts have considered the

103. Id. at 699-700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 700.
105. Id.
106. Darcy Jalandoni & David Shouvlin, Ohio and Twombly/Iqbal: Plausible?, OHIO LAWYER
(May/June 2015), https://www.porterwright.com/files/upload/OhioLawyer-Jalandoni-ShouvlinMay-June2015.pdf.http://www.porterwright.com/files/upload/OhioLawyer-Jalandoni-ShouvlinMay-June2015.pdf.#s.5 [https://perma.cc/G6UM-PFAN].
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issue. 107 Five have chosen to follow the federal court system and adopt
plausibility pleading, 108 while seven have remained committed to notice
pleading. 109 The remaining 18 jurisdictions have not yet considered the
issue and continue to utilize notice pleading by default. 110 One could
assert that although the Supreme Court circumvented the rule amendment
process, the change from notice pleading to plausibility pleading is so
significant that all former replica jurisdictions lost that status until they
decide to follow suit. And some have done just that.
As in the United States Supreme Court, the state jurisdictions that
have considered plausibility pleading have done so through judicial
interpretation, rather than through their established rulemaking processes.
The supreme courts of Colorado, Minnesota, and Tennessee are
illustrative examples to consider. The Colorado Supreme Court has
moved to plausibility pleading, in line with the decisions in Twombly and
Iqbal in an effort to maintain procedural uniformity with the federal
system. 111 The Minnesota 112 and Tennessee 113 state supreme courts
decided, on the contrary, to maintain notice pleading.
B.

Colorado Plausibility Pleading

On June 27, 2016, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled on the
notice/plausibility pleading issue in Warne v. Hall, when presented with
the opportunity to confirm the state’s pleading standard in light of the
Twiqbal decisions. 114 In a split 4-3 decision, the Court adopted plausibility
pleading in order to maintain uniformity with the FRCP. 115 As a replica
jurisdiction, Justice Coats explained, the Court had benefitted from having
procedural uniformity with the federal system. 116 The Court cited their
reliance on the federal courts to help interpret the Colorado pleading
107. See Appendix infra: Replica JurisdictionsArizona, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
and Washington.
108. See Appendix infra: Replica JurisdictionsColorado, District of Columbia, Maine,
Massachusetts, and South Dakota.
109. See Appendix infra: Replica JurisdictionsArizona, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington.
110. See Appendix infra: Replica Jurisdictions—Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky,
North Dakota, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming, Georgia, Kansas, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Idaho, Mississippi, and Nevada.
111. Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588, 590 (Colo. 2016).
112. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014).
113. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011).
114. Warne, 373 P.3d at 588.
115. Id. at 590.
116. Id. at 592.
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standard as a primary reason to maintain procedural uniformity. 117 And
while the Court admitted that federal decisions are not binding and that
the Court has occasionally deviated from the FRCP, a slim majority
concluded that disagreeing with the Supreme Court on the interpretation
of “short and plain statement” would “risk undermining confidence in the
judicial process and the objective interpretation of codified law.” 118
Additionally, just as in the Twiqbal cases, the Colorado Supreme
Court relied on a desire to mitigate the costs of modern litigation and
expensive discovery processes as a reason to adopt plausibility
pleading. 119 In fact, Justice Coats asserted that the impact of plausibility
pleading might prove to be even more important in Colorado than in the
federal court system. 120 Lastly, Justice Coats indicated that there is value
in maintaining a uniformity of procedure so that attorneys would feel just
as comfortable practicing in Colorado as they would in the federal
system. 121
Justice Gabriel, writing for the three-judge dissent, responded
persuasively to these arguments. He pointed out that the majority threw
out a rule that had been utilized by the Court for over 50 years with no
major concerns or problems. 122 In fact, he believed that this change to
plausibility pleading misinterpreted Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 8
and added a new requirement that did not exist in the rule as written in
order to maintain uniformity with the FRCP, which are not binding in state
courts. 123 Even worse, the dissent argued, other courts have found that
plausibility pleading “results in a loss of clarity, stability, and
predictability.” 124
In response to the majority’s argument that the state needs to
expedite litigation and avoid the rising costs of discovery, Justice Gabriel
reminded the majority that the Court recently implemented new case
management tools and changes to the rules regarding discovery just a year
earlier. 125 There was no reason to believe that these changes would not
adequately address these concerns and necessitate such a drastic departure
from the Court’s historical commitment to notice pleading. 126
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 597 (Gabriel, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601.
Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/12

16

Schantz: Impact of <i>Twombly & Iqbal</i>

2017]

IMPACT OF TWOMBLY & IQBAL

967

The dissenting opinion went on to list several of the most common
criticisms of plausibility pleading. For example, there are practical
limitations to how much information a plaintiff can provide in the
pleading stage before any discovery has occurred.127 This is especially
evident in cases of discrimination where a plaintiff would not have access
to much of the evidence because it resides with the defendant. 128 Also, in
response to concerns about baseless claims, Justice Gabriel reminded the
majority that all pleadings are subject to the requirements of Colorado
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which mandates the signature of an attorney
of record as certification that the pleading is warranted by existing law
and is made in good faith. 129 He concluded by indicating that there is no
evidence that notice pleading had contributed to a flood of frivolous
claims that cannot be weeded out by the checks and balances implicit in
the current civil rules. 130
Most significantly, Justice Gabriel warned that a change to
plausibility pleading would “deny access to justice for innumerable
plaintiffs with legitimate complaints.” 131 Nearly half of the Court believed
that there was no compelling reason to change the pleading standard for
Colorado. 132
In reviewing the state court decisions that have adopted plausibility
pleading the Colorado Supreme Court is the only one that outlines specific
arguments for the adoption of this new standard. 133 In fact, all of the other
jurisdictions simply adopt the plausibility standard because they agree
with the Supreme Court’s new interpretation of Rule 8. 134 This is
disconcerting given the drastic impact a change in pleading standard will
have on future litigants and the public’s access to the courts as Justice
Gabriel outlined in his dissenting opinion.
Because this change is so consequential, I offer several other
important counter arguments in addition to those outlined in Justice
Gabriel’s dissenting opinion. For example, Justice Coats indicates that
adopting the plausibility pleading standard is important so that Colorado
courts can rely on federal case law to aid in interpretation of the local
127. Id. at 598.
128. Id. at 599.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 598.
132. Id. at 597.
133. Id. at 588 (majority opinion).
134. See Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531 (D.C. 2011); Bean v.
Cummings, 939 A.2d 676 (Me. 2008); Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879 (Mass. 2008);
Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804 (S.D. 2008).
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rules. 135 However, the Justice fails to mention that any state that chooses
to follow the federal plausibility interpretation of Rule 8 leaves behind
decades of judicial history and interpretation. What about the years of
federal case law that will now be inapplicable to the Colorado court
system? This switch in pleading standard is a stark departure from past
federal and state judicial common law.
In addition, proponents of the adoption of plausibility pleading in
state court systems cite the same concern over expensive litigation and
discovery that the Supreme Court did in the Twiqbal decisions. 136 Critics
question whether this is really the case at the federal system, but even if it
is a valid federal concern, state court systems handle significantly
different cases than the federal system. Many of the most complicated and
expensive litigation is pursued in the federal courts. And even if the state
systems do have a discovery problem, the most appropriate way to deal
with such a problem is to reconsider the civil rules related to discovery,
not pleading. This approach would deal with the problem at hand instead
of making an over inclusive change to the pleading standard that would
affect all cases.
Procedural uniformity between the federal and state systems has
always been a value held by replica jurisdictions, and as such is a primary
argument for proponents of plausibility pleading in state courts. However,
it is clear that the importance of replica jurisdictions is fading. The
nationwide uniformity that the drafters of the FRCP had hoped to achieve
never came about. In fact, at its height replica jurisdictions included only
22 states plus the District of Columbia with an additional 7 that were close
to replica status. 137 In addition, there have been many actual (not just
interpretational) changes to the FRCP over the years that various replica
jurisdictions have not adopted. One must question what procedural
uniformity it is that these states are hoping to preserve.
C.

Minnesota Notice Pleading

There are seven states that have taken up the issue of plausibility
pleading and have decided to remain committed to the liberal notice
pleading standard. 138 In one such case, Walsh v U.S. Bank, 139 the
Minnesota Supreme Court unambiguously declared the Court’s

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Warne, 373 P.3d at 593.
Id. at 594.
See Appendix infra: Replica Jurisdictions.
See Appendix infra: Replica Jurisdictions.
Walsh v. U.S. Bank, 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014).
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commitment to notice pleading. 140 Justice Lillehaug, writing for the
majority, explained that the language of Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure (MRCP) 8 has been the same since it was adopted in 1951,141
and that the Court was not bound to follow the changes outlined in
Twiqbal. 142 The Justice pointed out that noticeably absent from Rule 8 or
any of the MRCP is the word “plausible.” 143 Minnesota Supreme Court
case law did not allow for the addition of words or phrases to
unambiguous statutes or rules. 144 And given that MRCP 8 had been
successfully interpreted without confusion for nearly 60 years, there was
no reason to consider editing its content. 145 Stare decisis required the
Court to remain committed to former decisions in order to promote the
“stability of law and the integrity of the judicial process.” 146
Justice Lillehaug then explained the history and purpose behind
MRCP 8. Minnesota made a conscious decision when developing the
MRCP to turn away from code pleading towards notice pleading allowing
general statements in a complaint, which may express conclusions. 147 The
focus should be on the incident rather than the specific facts of the incident
at the pleading stage. 148 Plausibility, on the other hand, headed the
opposite direction requiring more facts and specificity which makes it
harder for a plaintiff to meet the pleading standard. 149
Next, Justice Lillehaug considered the context of MRCP 8, which
“cuts against the plausibility standard, for five reasons.” 150 First, when the
MRCP require more factual specificity, they expressly call for it. 151 For
example, MRCP 9, “Pleading Special Matters,” outlines the requirements
in order to plead fraud or mistake, which must be stated with
particularity. 152 No such language exists in Rule 8, which governs general
claims. 153 Second, the MRCP express a preference for short statements
that are simple and concise. 154 In order to rise to the level of plausibility

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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pleading, utilizing the two pronged approach outlined in Iqbal, a claim
would have to be much longer, complicated, and detailed.
Third, the Justice pointed out that the sample complaints included in
the MRCP clearly illustrate that short and plain statements are
adequate. 155 Fourth, MRCP 12 provides a way to deal with any lack of
precision that results from a liberal, notice pleading standard. 156 A party
may move for a more “definite statement” of the pleadings if more detail
is necessary to proceed with the case. 157 Lastly, the MRCP already
provide multiple case-management tools to help promote an effective and
efficient determination of every action when concerns are raised regarding
the cost of discovery. 158 In conclusion, the Justice indicated that “based
on Rule 8.01’s plain language, purpose and history . . . we decline to adopt
the plausibility standard.” 159 There was no dissenting opinion filed in this
case.
D.

Tennessee Notice Pleading

Justice Lee and the Supreme Court of Tennessee also chose to remain
committed to notice pleading in Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for
Humanity, Inc., 160 and cited several additional reasons why the state
would not abandon its liberal pleading standard. As with all replica
jurisdictions, the Tennessee court has a “firmly established and
longstanding” commitment to notice pleading which existed even before
the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure (TRCP).161 First
of all, Justice Lee pointed out that the federal adoption of plausibility
pleading is a sharp departure from the past and has brought “a loss of
clarity, stability and predictability in federal pleadings practice.”162 Indeed
the consideration of only two cases drastically changed the federal
approach to one of the most fundamental rights we retain as citizens:
access to the courts. Justice Lee indicated that this new approach is not
only flawed but also has no practical model to demonstrate how to test
factual sufficiency in the pleading of one’s case. 163

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 605-06.
159. Id. at 606.
160. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011).
161. Id. at 427.
162. Id. at 430-31.
163. Id. at 431 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inverting Test, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010)).
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Secondly, Justice Lee pointed out that plausibility pleading requires
the court to make an evaluation about the likelihood of success based on
the merits at the earliest stages of the proceedings before adequate facts
have been admitted or perhaps even discovered. 164 This new approach not
only seems nonsensical, but Justice Lee had concerns about the possibility
of state constitutional questions being raised about the right to a jury
trial. 165 Next, Justice Lee expressed concern about the potential
disproportionate impact of this type of early evaluation of claims in cases
that require discovery in order to be proven, like violations of civil rights,
employment discrimination, antitrust, and conspiracy. 166 The motivations
and intents of the potential defendants in these types of cases can be hard
enough to uncover with the aid of the discovery process, let alone without
it.
Lastly, the Justice pointed out that neither the defendant nor amici
curiae had provided any evidence that the policy concerns that drove the
federal courts to make a change in its interpretation of Rule 8 were present
in the Tennessee state court system. 167 Justice Gabriel made the same
criticism in response to the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision to adopt
federal plausibility pleading and it is worth repeating. 168 Almost all of the
state courts that have adopted plausibility pleading have done so blindly
following the federal decision without even the consideration of whether
the reasons the Supreme Court outlined in Twiqbal apply to their
respective state courts. This kind of cursory deliberation seems out of step
with the significant impact the decision will have on public access to the
courts. Justice Lee concludes, “such a broad and sweeping change in the
procedural landscape . . . should come by operation of the normal rulemaking process” that is much better suited for its consideration. 169
VI. THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ohio’s Replica Status and Focus on Notice Pleading

A.

Ohio adopted its own Civil Rules of Procedure (ORCP) in 1970,
making it one of the 23 replica jurisdictions. 170 In an effort to maintain
uniformity with the federal system and transition away from being a code164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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pleading jurisdiction, Ohio became a notice-pleading jurisdiction. 171
“Ohio cases embraced the liberal pleading standard embodied by the
[FRCP] right from the start.” 172 In 1975, the Supreme Court of Ohio
formally adopted Conley in O’Brien v. University Community Tenants
Union. 173 In O’Brien, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that although a
plaintiff’s claim may be difficult to prove in later stages of the litigation,
it should nonetheless survive a motion to dismiss “unless it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim.” 174
Even before the Twiqbal decisions, Ohio had begun to move away
from being a replica jurisdiction. 175 Since the adoption of the ORCP, Ohio
has moved away from the FRCP at least nine times. 176 Over the years,
there are many states that have made similar choices for various
reasons. 177 The fact that Ohio was really no longer a replica jurisdiction,
even before the changes made by the Twiqbal decisions, cuts against the
argument that Ohio should adopt plausibility pleading in order to maintain
a no longer existing uniformity with the FRCP. 178 Not only the text, but
also the interpretation of numerous ORCP, would need to change in order
to attain this uniformity once again.179
More than just adopting a liberal notice pleading standard, the ORCP
are written to explicitly state the importance of just results over technical
accuracy. This is the first topic addressed in the ORCP, clarifying this
emphasis before any of the specific procedural rules. Ohio Civ. R. 1(B):
Construction of the Civil Rules-In General states:
Construction. These rules shall be construed and applied to effect just
results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other
impediments to the expeditious administration of justice. 180

The 1970 staff notes that accompany Civ. R. 1(B) added, “emphasis
is placed upon liberal construction rather than upon technical
interpretation.” 181 In Peterson v. Teodosio, an early decision that is often
cited in cases where court rules are being considered, the Ohio Supreme
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id. at 504.
O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 1975).
Id. at 755 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Jochum, supra note 27, at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See OHIO CIV. R. 1(B) (emphasis added).
OHIO R. CIV. P. 1 staff note (1970).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/12

22

Schantz: Impact of <i>Twombly & Iqbal</i>

2017]

IMPACT OF TWOMBLY & IQBAL

973

Court stated, “[t]he spirit of the Civil Rules is the resolution of cases upon
their merits, not upon pleading deficiencies. Civ. R. 1(B) requires that the
Civil Rules shall be applied ‘to effect just results.’ Pleadings are simply
an end to that objective.” 182 In other words, when questions arise given
the meaning or intention of the ORCP, the rule in question should always
be interpreted to ensure just results. Similarly, in Cargill, Inc. v. Shiloh
Tank and Erection Co., the court went so far as to declare that “the
‘cardinal principle’ of Civ. R. 1(B) is to effect ‘just results.’ The general
purpose of avoiding delay cannot elevate disagreements between counsel
into a denial of justice.” 183
As already mentioned, this emphasis on just results applies to all the
ORCP as reflected in Ohio Civ. R. 8: General Rules for Pleading. Rule 8,
which outlines a liberal notice pleading standard, mirrors the FRCP at the
time:
(A) Claims for relief. A pleading that sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the party is entitled to relief
....
(E) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(F) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as
to do substantial justice. 184

Since the adoption of the ORCP, the Ohio Supreme Court has
consistently applied this liberal notice pleading standard as demonstrated
in York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol. When considering a motion to
dismiss, the Court outlined that the Ohio pleading regimen reflected a
liberal approach. 185 The Court stated:
[A] plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage.
Very often, the evidence necessary for a plaintiff to prevail is not
obtained until the plaintiff is able to discover materials in the
defendant’s possession. If the plaintiff were required to prove his or her

182. Peterson v. Teodosio, 297 N.E.2d 113, 122 (Ohio 1973).
183. Cargill, Inc. v. Shiloh Tank and Erection Company, Case No. 7816, 1982 WL 3837, at *2
(Ohio Dist. Ct. App. 2 Oct. 27, 1982).
184. See OHIO CIV. R. 8 (emphasis added).
185. York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 573 N.E.2d 1063, 1065 (Ohio 1991).
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case in the complaint, many valid claims would be dismissed because of
the plaintiff’s lack of access to relevant evidence. 186

Similarly, in Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A., once again considering a
motion to dismiss, the Court stated that, “as long as there is a set of facts,
consistent with the plaintiff’s complaint, which would allow the plaintiff
to recover, the court may not grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” 187
This language is very similar to the language of Conley v. Gibson, 188
which outlined the liberal notice pleading standard for the federal courts.
B.

Ways to Amend ORCP

Each state has a specific process for amending court rules. In some
states, it is a legislative process. In others, changes are made through the
development of the common law via court decisions. In Ohio, the
rulemaking and amending process is outlined in the state constitution.189
In 1968, the citizens of Ohio approved the Modern Courts Amendment to
the Ohio Constitution granting the Ohio Supreme Court rule-making
authority. 190 The process outlined for amending the ORCP is deliberate,
comprehensive, and multi-layered demonstrating the serious
consideration required before changing the Rules. Pursuant to this
responsibility, the Ohio Supreme Court created the Commission on the
Rules of Practice and Procedure (Commission) to facilitate the process. 191
The Commission includes 19 members including judges and practicing
attorneys. 192
The Commission considers any proposed amendments to the ORCP
and submits them to the Ohio Supreme Court. 193 The Court then
authorizes the proposed amendments for public comment without any
endorsement or revisions. 194 This period allows the legal community and
the public at large to provide meaningful feedback about the proposed

186. Id.
187. Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136,
at ¶ 5 (Ohio 2002) (quoting York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 573 N.E.2d 1063, 1065 (Ohio 1991)).
188. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
189. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
190. Process on Amending the Rules of Practice and Procedure in Ohio Courts, THE SUPREME
COURT OF OHIO AND THE OHIO JUDICIAL SYSTEM, http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/
ruleamendments/documents/P%20%20P%20Final%20Rules%20June%2030%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/549C-2PF5] (last visited May, 15, 2018).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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changes and the potential impact on the judicial process. 195 After the
closing of this period, the Commission considers the feedback gathered,
makes appropriate revisions, and submits the updated proposed
amendments to the Court. 196 The Court then files the proposed
amendments with the General Assembly and begins a second round of
public comments. 197 The Commission again considers the public feedback
and makes final revisions before submitting to the Court. 198 The Court
may then accept any or all of the proposed amendments and files those
with the General Assembly. 199 If the General Assembly does not enact
legislation disapproving the amendments, they become effective. 200
The multi-step process provides deliberate and intentional feedback.
Absent a meaningful reason to circumvent this process, any changes or
amendments to the ORCP should follow these procedures to ensure that
changes are made in light of Ohio’s historical commitment to just results
above all else.
C.

Ohio Appellate Court Split Since Twiqbal
1. Ohio State Court System

The Supreme Court of Ohio is the court of last resort for the state. 201
Most of its cases are appealed from the 12 district courts of appeals. 202
The Court must also hear cases in which there have been conflicting
opinions from two or more of these district courts. Similarly, the district
courts of appeals hear cases that have been appealed from the courts of
common pleas, municipal, and county courts in their respective districts.
At this time, the topic of pleading standards has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court of Ohio even though there have been cases from the courts
of appeals that have presented this issue. 203 By default, Ohio remains a
notice pleading state.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Judicial System Structure, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO AND THE OHIO JUDICIAL
SYSTEM, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JudSystem/default.asp [https://perma.cc/MKJ5-MNHJ]
(last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
202. Id.
203. Brief for Appellant, Francisco et al., v. Oberlin City School District Board of Education,
No. 10-0873, 2010 WL 2097542 (Ohio Sup. Ct. May 14, 2010).
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2. Ohio State Court Case Study: District Court Split
The situation in the Ohio court system is reflective of the confusion
the Twiqbal decisions created for the federal court system. On the one
hand, Ohio is officially a notice pleading state because the ORCP have
not been amended and the Ohio Supreme Court has not changed the
interpretation of the Rules through common law. On the other hand,
pleading standards do not appear to be consistent across the state. In fact,
a continuum of interpretation is developing given the lack of clarity
regarding the impact of plausibility pleading in Ohio. At first glance it
appears as though notice pleading is safe and sound in Ohio, however, if
you look closely at the progression of cases in the different district courts
the picture becomes less clear.
Only 2 of Ohio’s 12 district courts (Second204 and Seventh 205) have
addressed the issue directly and confirmed notice pleading. Six of the
districts (First, 206 Third, 207 Fifth, 208 Sixth, 209 and Twelfth 210) have not
directly addressed plausibility pleading but have indirectly cited their
commitment to notice pleading. The Fourth District has not addressed the
issue at all, so it remains a notice pleading jurisdiction by default. It
remains unclear what direction the Tenth 211 and Eleventh 212 Districts
intend to head, so it may or may not be safe to assume notice pleading
remains. The Ninth District, which has been repeatedly cited for making
the move to plausibility pleading, seems to have expressly adopted this
change by its continued reliance on the Twiqbal decisions. 213 And lastly
the Eighth District, which has by far heard the most cases on the issue, has
204. See Sacksteder v. Senney, 2012-Ohio-4452, No. 24993, 2012 WL 4480695 (Ohio Ct. App.
2d Dist. Sept. 28, 2012).
205. See Bahen v. Diocese of Steubenville, 2012-Ohio-4452, No. 11 JE 34, 2013 WL 2316640
(Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. May 24, 2013).
206. See Poole v. Lenzly, 2013-Ohio-4148, No. C-130141, 2013 WL 5432132 (Ohio Ct. App.
1st Dist. Sept. 25, 2013).
207. See Baker v. Mosler, 2013-Ohio-4976, No. 1-13-05, 2013 WL 6035327 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d
Dist. Nov. 12, 2013).
208. See New Lexington City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Muzo Inv. Group, 2016-Ohio-1138,
No. 15-CA-00012, 2016 WL 1243203 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Mar. 29, 2016).
209. See US Bank v. Coffey, 2012-Ohio-721, No. E-11-026, 2012 WL 601472 (Ohio Ct. App.
6th Dist. Feb. 24, 2012).
210. See Klan v. Medical Radiologists, 2014-Ohio-2344, No. CA2014-01-007, 2014 WL
2526116 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. June 2, 2014).
211. See Carasalina, LLC v. Smith Phillips & Assocs., 2014-Ohio-2423, No. 13AP-1027, 2014
WL 2573466 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. June 5, 2014).
212. See Ragazzo v. City of Willowick, 2017-Ohio-9337, No. 2017-L-061, 2017 WL 6729203
(Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. Dec. 29, 2017).
213. See Vagas v. City of Hudson, 2009-Ohio-6794, No. 24713, 2009 WL 4981219 (Ohio Ct.
App. 9th Dist. Dec. 23, 2009).
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flip-flopped back and forth between accepting and rejecting plausibility
pleading. 214

District
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th

Chart I: Ohio Courts of Appeals 215
Pleading
Standard
Most Recent Case Name
Notice
Poole v. Lenzly 216
Notice
Sacksteder v. Senney 217
Notice
Baker v. Mosler 218
Notice
n/a
Citibank, NA v.
Notice
Abrahamson 219
Notice
US Bank v. Coffey 220
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v.
Notice
Brown 221
Both
Smiley v. Cleveland 222
Plausibility
Vagas v. City of Hudson 223
Carasalina v. Smith Phillips
Not Clear
and Assoc. 224
Ragazzo v. City of
Not Clear
Willowick 225

Directly
Address?
Indirectly
Yes
Indirectly
No
Indirectly
Indirectly
Yes
Yes
Yes
Unknown
Indirectly

214. See infra Chart II.
215. This chart lists the Ohio Courts of Appeals and the most recent case in each district that
addresses (or not) plausibility pleading.
216. Poole v. Lenzly, 2013-Ohio-4148, No. C-130141, 2013 WL 5432132 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st
Dist. Sept. 25, 2013).
217. Sacksteder v. Senney, 2012-Ohio-4452, No. 24993, 2012 WL 4480695 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d
Dist. Sept. 28, 2012).
218. Baker v. Mosler, 2013-Ohio-4976, No. 1-13-05, 2013 WL 6035327 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist.
Nov. 12, 2013).
219. Citibank, NA v. Abrahmson, 2017-Ohio-5566, No. AP-11-0055, 2017 WL 2817571 (Ohio
Ct. App. 5th Dist. June 28, 2017).
220. US Bank v. Coffey, 2012-Ohio-721, No. E-11-026, 2012 WL 601472 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th
Dist. Feb. 24, 2012).
221. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n. v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-9237, No. 16-CO-0008, 2017 WL 6550544
(Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. Dec. 22, 2017)
222. Smiley v Cleveland, 2016-Ohio-7711, No. 103987, 2016 WL 6673178 (Ohio Ct. App. Dist.
8th Nov. 10, 2016).
223. Vagas v. City of Hudson, 2009-Ohio-6794, No. 24713, 2009 WL 4981219 (Ohio Ct. App.
9th Dist. Dec. 23, 2009).
224. Carasalina, LLC v. Smith Phillips & Assocs., 2014-Ohio-2423, No. 13AP-1027, 2014 WL
2573466 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. June 5, 2014).
225. Ragazzo v. City of Willowick, 2017-Ohio-9337, No. 2017-L-061, 2017 WL 6729203
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Klan v. Medical
Radiologists 226

[51:951

Indirectly

To demonstrate the confusion that the federal move to plausibility
pleading has caused in Ohio, consider in more detail the Eighth District’s
cases on the matter. As of 2017, there have been over 40 published
decisions in Ohio that have considered plausibility pleading and half of
those have been in the Eighth District Court of Appeals, and the holdings
in those cases have been “inopportunely inconsistent.” 227
Gallo v. Westfield National Insurance Co. 228 made the first reference
to Twombly in the Eighth District and was continually cited as establishing
the move towards plausibility pleading. 229 Without directly addressing the
issue or providing reasons for this change, the court applied the
plausibility standard when considering the facts of the case and
determined that the “complaint must be plausible, rather than
conceivable.” 230
Four years later, the Eighth District returned to citing the liberal
pleading standard of Rule 8 in State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall 231 and Bush v.
Cleveland Municipal School District. 232 Once again, the Court did not
directly address plausibility pleading, but simply returned to citing the
traditional Rule 8 liberal notice pleading standard and applied it to the
facts of the cases. Then in Dottore v. Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease,
L.L.P. the court recognized the fact that both the plausibility and
traditional notice standards had been recently utilized in Ohio but
(Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. Dec. 29, 2017).
226. Klan v. Medical Radiologists, 2014-Ohio-2344, No. CA2014-01-007, 2014 WL 2526116
(Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. June 2, 2014).
227. Jalandoni & Shouvlin, supra note 107.
228. Gallo v. Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co., 2009-Ohio-1094, No. 91813, 2009 WL 625522 (Ohio
Ct. App. 8th Dist. Mar. 12, 2009).
229. See Williams v. Ohio Edison, 2009-Ohio-5702, No. 92840, 2009 WL 3490945, at ¶ 15
(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Oct. 29, 2009); Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2010Ohio-266, No. 93523, 2010 WL 323420, at ¶ 11 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Jan. 28, 2010); Fink v.
Twentieth Cent. Homes, Inc., 2010-Ohio-5486, No. 94519, 2010 WL 4520482, at ¶ 24 (Ohio Ct. App.
8th Dist. Nov. 10, 2010); DiGiorgio v. Cleveland, 196 Ohio. App. 3d 575, 579 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th
Dist. 2011); Snowville Subdivision Joint Venture Phase I v. Home S. & L. of Youngstown, Ohio,
2012-Ohio-1342, No. 96675, 2012 WL 1067748, at ¶¶ 9, 10 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Mar. 29, 2012);
Cleveland v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 2013-Ohio-1035, No. 98656, 2013 WL 1183332, at ¶ 11
(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Mar. 21, 2013).
230. See Gallo, 2009 WL 625522, at ¶ 9 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)).
231. State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall, No. 99454, 2013 WL 2382824 at ¶¶ 10, 12 (Ohio Ct. App.
8th Dist. May 24, 2013).
232. Bush v. Cleveland Mun. School Dist., 2013-Ohio-5420, No. 99612, 2013 WL 6571821, at
¶¶ 5, 12 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Dec. 12, 2013).
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“decline[ed] to address the . . . stricter ‘plausibility standard’ set forth
in Twombly and its progeny.” 233
The court finally seemed to come to the conclusion that Ohio was
indeed a notice pleading jurisdiction in Tuleta v. Medical Mutual of
Ohio. 234 In that case, Judge Boyle thoroughly recited the history of Ohio’s
pleading standard and the federal move to plausibility pleading. 235 In light
of that history, the federal decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, and the related
Ohio appellate decisions, the court rejected the assertion that it had
adopted plausibility pleading simply because it had cited to it, and further
rejected the “contention that we should apply the heightened federal
pleading standard.” 236 Given the thorough nature of the discussion,
Tuleta 237 became the standing authority on the issue. 238
Most recently, though, another set of cases bounced back and forth
citing both pleading standards. The court in Sultaana v. Horseshoe Casino
returned to the habit of applying Twombly via reference to DiGiorno v.
Cleveland 239 and called for “further factual enhancement.” 240 A year later,
Smiley v. Cleveland expressly rejected Twombly via Tuleta as if it were a
foregone conclusion. 241 This tedious recitation of this case history is not
meant to nitpick the court, but to illustrate the inconsistent positions that
have developed throughout the state. This is what can happen when the
courts rely on holdings in individual cases rather than the established rulemaking process to clarify or amend civil rules. Singular issues and
perspectives may be addressed through case law, but comprehensive
consideration of the important topic is lost. Given the focus of the ORCP
on just results, the pleading standard in Ohio should not be changed unless
given due consideration. However, this topic has not made it to the
Commission.
233. Dottore v. Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., 2014-Ohio-25, No. 98861, 2014 WL
72538, at ¶ 122 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Jan. 9, 2014).
234. Tuleta v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2014-Ohio-396, 6 N.E.3d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Feb.
6, 2014).
235. Id. at 113-14.
236. Id. at 115.
237. Id.
238. See Hendrickson v. Haven Place, Inc., 2014-Ohio-3726, No. 100816, 2014 WL 4261947,
at ¶¶ 8, 9 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Aug. 28, 2014); Henderson v. State, 2015-Ohio-1742, No. 101862,
2015 WL 2168359, at ¶ 9 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. May 7, 2015); Mangelluzzi v. Morley, 2015-Ohio3143, 40 N.E.3d 588 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Aug. 6, 2015).
239. DiGorgio v. Cleveland, 2011-Ohio-5878, No. 95945, 2011 WL 5517366 (Ohio Ct. App.
8th Dist. Nov. 10, 2011).
240. Sultaana v. Horseshoe Casino, 2015-Ohio-4083, No. 102501, 2015 WL 5781097, at ¶ 12
(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 8th Oct. 1, 2015).
241. Smiley v. Cleveland, 2016-Ohio-7711, No. 103987, 2016 WL 6673178, at ¶ 5 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dist. 8th Nov. 10, 2016).
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Chart II: Ohio Court of Appeals, Eighth District 242
Date

Case Name

Holding

Mar. 12,
2009

Gallo v. Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co. 243

Cited Twombly

Oct. 29,
2009

Williams v. Ohio Edison 244

Cited Twombly

Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Regional
Transit Auth. 245

Cited Twombly

Fink v. Twentieth Century Homes, Inc. 246

Cited Twombly

DiGorgio v. Cleveland 247
Snowville Subdivision Joint Venture
Phase I v. Home S. & L. of
Youngstown 248

Cited Twombly via Parsons

Cleveland v. JP Morgan Chase Bank 249

Cited Twombly via Gallo

State ex rel Yeaples v. Gall 250

Notice pleading

Bush v. Cleveland Muni. Sch. Dist. 251

Notice pleading

Jan. 28,
2010
Nov. 10,
2010
Nov. 10,
2011
Mar. 29,
2012
Mar. 21,
2013
May 24,
2013
Dec. 12,
2013

Cited Twombly

242. This chart lists the cases from the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals that have
addressed notice and plausibility pleading.
243. Gallo v. Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co., 2009-Ohio-1094, No. 91813, 2009 WL 625522 (Ohio
Ct. App. 8th Dist. Mar. 12, 2009).
244. Williams v. Ohio Edison, 2009-Ohio-5702, No. 92840, 2009 WL 3490945 (Ohio Ct. App.
8th Dist. Oct. 29, 2009).
245. Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2010-Ohio-266, No. 93523, 2010
WL 323420 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Jan. 28, 2010).
246. Fink v. Twentieth Cent. Homes, Inc., 2010-Ohio-5486, No. 94519, 2010 WL 4520482
(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Nov. 10, 2010).
247. DiGorgio v. Cleveland, 2011-Ohio-5878, No. 95945, 2011 WL 5517366 (Ohio Ct. App.
8th Dist. Nov. 10, 2011).
248. Snowville Subdivision Joint Venture Phase I v. Home S. & L. of Youngstown, Ohio, 2012Ohio-1342, No. 96675, 2012 WL 1067748 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Mar. 29, 2012).
249. Cleveland v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 2013-Ohio-1035, No. 98656, 2013 WL
1183332 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Mar. 21, 2013).
250. State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall, No. 99454, 2013 WL 2382824 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. May
24, 2013).
251. Bush v. Cleveland Mun. School Dist., 2013-Ohio-5420, No. 99612, 2013 WL 6571821
(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Dec. 12, 2013).
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Dottore v. Vorys, Sater, Seymour &
Pease 252

Acknowledges divide,
but does not address

Tuleta v. Med. Mut. of Ohio 253

Notice pleading

Klan v. Medical Radiologists 254

Cited Tuleta, notice pleading

Hendrickson v. Haven Place, Inc. 255

Cited Tuleta, notice pleading

Henderson v. State 256

Cited Tuleta, notice pleading

Aug. 6,
2015

Mangelluzzi v. Morley 257

Cited Tuleta, notice pleading

Oct. 1,
2015

Sultaana v. Horseshoe Casino 258

Cited Twombly via DiGiorno

Nov. 10,
2016

Smiley v. Cleveland 259

Expressly rejects Twombly

Jan. 9, 2014
Mar. 13,
2014
June 2,
2014
Aug. 28,
2014
May 7,
2015

3. What has the Ohio Supreme Court Said (if anything)?
Ohio became a notice pleading state in 1970 with the adoption of the
ORCP. 260 As outlined in Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp.:
All pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice . . .
reject[ing] the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the

252. Dottore v. Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., 2014-Ohio-25, No. 98861, 2014 WL
72538 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Jan. 9, 2014).
253. Tuleta v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2014-Ohio-396, 6 N.E.3d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Feb.
6, 2014).
254. Klan v. Medical Radiologists, 2014-Ohio-2344, No. CA2014-01-007, 2014 WL 2526116
(Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. June 2, 2014).
255. Hendrickson v. Haven Place, Inc., 2014-Ohio-3726, No. 100816, 2014 WL 4261947 (Ohio
Ct. App. 8th Dist. Aug. 28, 2014)
256. Henderson v. State, 2015-Ohio-1742, No. 101862, 2015 WL 2168359 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th
Dist. May 7, 2015)
257. Mangelluzzi v. Morley, 2015-Ohio-3143, 40 N.E.3d 588 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Aug. 6,
2015).
258. Sultaana v. Horseshoe Casino, 2015-Ohio-4083, No. 102501, 2015 WL 5781097 (Ohio Ct.
App. 8th Dist. 8th Oct. 1, 2015).
259. Smiley v. Cleveland, 2016-Ohio-7711, No. 103987, 2016 WL 6673178 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dist. 8th Nov. 10, 2016).
260. Jochum, supra note 27, at 503.
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principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision
on the merits. 261

More recently, in York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, the Ohio Supreme
Court confirmed that a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at
the pleading stage. 262 “If the plaintiff were required to prove his or her
case in the complaint, many valid claims would be dismissed because of
the plaintiff’s lack of access to relevant evidence.”263 These are just two
of the many times the Ohio Supreme Court outlined its commitment to
notice pleading.
As illustrated by the Colorado, Minnesota, and Tennessee state
supreme courts, states are being forced to reconsider their pleading
standard in the wake of the Twiqbal decisions. The Ohio Supreme Court
has yet to address this specific issue even though it is required to review
conflicting opinions among two or more of the courts of appeals. 264
However, there have been cases where a dissenting Justice has felt it
necessary to remind the court that Ohio is a notice-pleading jurisdiction.
For example, in Kincaid v. Erie Insurance, Justice Brown wrote for the
dissent and reminded the majority that Ohio is a notice pleading state and
“[t]he goal of a notice-pleading standard is to avoid dismissal of claims
because of hypertechnical legal requirements. Notice pleading is just
that—a pleading that gives notice of the claims asserted.” 265
And again in State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall, Justice O’Neill wrote in
his dissent that he is troubled by the degree of specificity the majority
looked for in determining if the complaint sufficiently met the notice
pleading standard. 266 The complaint clearly identified the defendant and
stated the basis for the claim. 267 “In Ohio, that is all that is required.” 268
Until such time that the ORCP are amended or the Ohio Supreme Court
addresses the issue of plausibility pleading, Ohio will officially remain a
notice pleading state, but there is plenty of evidence that not all of the
district judges share this opinion.

261. Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 92 (1975) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S 41, 48 (1957)).
262. York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St. 3d 143 (1991).
263. Id. at 145.
264. See Judicial System Structure, supra note 201.
265. Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 128 Ohio St. 3d 322, 327 (2010) (Brown, J., dissenting).
266. State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall, 141 Ohio St. 3d 234, 242-43 (2014) (O’Neill, J., dissenting).
267. Id.
268. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/12

32

Schantz: Impact of <i>Twombly & Iqbal</i>

2017]

IMPACT OF TWOMBLY & IQBAL

983

VII. OHIO SHOULD REMAIN COMMITTED TO NOTICE PLEADING
Regardless of replica status, Ohio should remain committed to notice
pleading. Many of the reasons for this recommendation were outlined by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Walsh v. US. Bank, N.A., 269 and the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for
Humanity, Inc., 270 as well as in the Warne v. Hall 271 dissent of the
Colorado Supreme Court. These reasons include:
• Plausibility pleading represents a drastic departure from the
decades long successful application of the liberal notice
pleading standard. Stare decisis requires the Court to remain
true to prior court decisions. 272
• The plausibility standard is unclear and practically hard to
apply. 273
• There are other civil rules that more directly address issues
related to discovery and the litigation process. 274
• Constitutional concerns regarding the right to a jury trial are
raised when judges prematurely rule on the merits of a claim
before sufficient discovery has been allowed.275 As already
outlined, Ohio’s long-established preference for just results
is outlined in Ohio Civ. Rule 1(B).
Given this predisposition, notice pleading is the only alternative for the
state. The nature of plausibility pleading is such that some meritorious
cases will be inappropriately dismissed simply because the plaintiff
cannot provide enough facts to meet the heightened standard. This
approach would favor efficiency over just results and be in direct conflict
with the foundational purposes of the ORCP.
In light of Ohio’s focus on just results, plausibility pleading is
inappropriate because it is harder for a judge to fairly apply this standard.
Plausibility pleading requires a litigant to plead their case with sufficient
facts so that the judge can use their common sense and experience to
evaluate whether the claim moves beyond possible to probable without
the benefit of any discovery devices. 276 This standard “gives judges too
269. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014).
270. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011).
271. Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2016).
272. Id. at 601.
273. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 431.
274. Warne, 373 P.3d at 601 (Gabriel, J., dissenting).
275. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 432.
276. Michael Sheran, Diverging Paths: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision to Reject the
“Plausibility” Pleading Standard in Walsh v U.S. Bank, 41 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. SUA SPONTE
1654, 1682 (2015).
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much discretion in controlling a claim’s fate.” 277 Whereas in a notice
pleading jurisdiction the judge only has to make sure that the defendant
has been notified of the claims being made, which requires a much less
subjective evaluation. The more liberal notice pleading approach insures
that every person will have their day in court if they meet the minimum
requirements of the Rules.
Concerns over information asymmetry and accessibility of the trial
process are especially relevant for pro se clients. The judicial system is
intimidating and confusing enough for citizens who pursue cases with the
help of an attorney, let alone for those who choose or are forced to
represent themselves. Plausibility pleading’s heightened standard and
confusing requirements creates yet another hurdle for these parties. Those
who stand to benefit from this kind of system are corporate or
governmental defendants who wish to avoid civil litigation. 278 “In this
regard, plausibility pleading seems to be part of a broader agenda to limit
citizen access to the courts. . . .” 279 Such an attempt is certainly not in line
with the intentions of the ORCP and does not benefit Ohio citizens.
Perhaps the most important consideration for jurisdictions to make is
whether the change in pleading standard would disproportionately affect
certain kinds of cases. The plausibility pleading standard is especially
difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy when the essential information needed to
support the complaint is in the hands of the defendant. This is the case
with civil rights and employment discrimination cases, among others. 280
In these cases, the plaintiffs need the help of the discovery process to
secure the evidence needed to prove their case, “since the defendant has
been able to conceal this evidence so effectively.” 281 This problem is
amplified by the fact that a plaintiff in this situation is often a lone
individual taking on a large organization in an attempt to secure their
rights. Should a concern about potentially expensive discovery bar
plaintiffs from being able to challenge the violation of these most basic
rights?
In the past, this information asymmetry was addressed through basic
pleading requirements and liberal discovery process. 282 Plausibility
pleading removes the ability of some litigants to pursue cases because the

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Funk et al., supra note 41, at 12-13.
Id. at 15.
Michalski, supra note 3, at 120.
Funk et al., supra note 41, at 10.
Id.
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amount of evidence they will need to present just to proceed to trial is too
onerous and inaccessible.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Twiqbal decisions set the federal court system on a new course,
changing the pleading requirements for federal litigants. Given the
changing nature of the FRCP and the decreased importance of replica
jurisdiction status, state court systems should take a hard look at the
implications of changing the pleading standard before following the
federal trend. As one of these replica jurisdictions, Ohio is presented with
this issue. Due to the inconsistent application of plausibility pleading that
has occurred in the Ohio Courts of Appeals, the issue needs to be
proactively addressed. Ideally, no change will be made, and the Ohio
Supreme Court will take advantage of this opportunity to recommit the
state to notice pleading. But if there is a need to examine the Ohio pleading
standard, or more appropriately the ORCP related to discovery, the normal
rule-amending process should be followed to ensure the rights of all Ohio
citizens to access the courts.
This country has a long-held belief that access to justice via the court
system is a fundamental right guaranteed to all people. This includes those
litigants that, due to the nature of their claim or available resources, may
not have access to all of the evidence related to their suit before trial
commences. If Ohio’s pleading standard is heightened these litigants
would essentially be cut off from the court system and their fundamental
rights. The process to make changes to both the FRCP and state rules are
thorough and deliberate to ensure that a change like this could not happen.
Efficient use of court resources is important but certainly no more
important that every person’s right to have their day in court.
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APPENDIX: REPLICA JURISDICTIONS 283
Status as
of 2017

Directly
Addressed

Case Name

Alabama

Notice

No

n/a

Alaska

Notice

No

n/a

Arizona

Notice

Yes

Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. 284

Colorado
District of
Columbia

Plausibility

Yes

Plausibility

Yes

Warne v. Hall 285
Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of
Columbia 286

Hawaii

Notice

No

n/a

Indiana

Notice

No

n/a

Kentucky

Notice

No

n/a

Maine

Plausibility

Yes

Bean v. Cummings 287

Massachusetts

Plausibility

Yes

Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co. 288

Minnesota

Notice

Yes

Montana

Notice

Yes

Walsh v. U.S. Bank 289
Brilz v. Metropolitan General Ins.
Co. 290

New Mexico

Notice

No

Zamora v. St. Vincent Hosp. 291

North Dakota

Notice

No

n/a

Ohio

Notice

No

Rhode Island

Notice

No

n/a
DiLibero v. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys, Inc., 292

South Dakota

Plausibility

Yes

Tennessee

Notice

Yes

Replica States

Sisney v. Best Inc. 293
Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for
Humanity, Inc. 294

283. This chart lists each of the “replica” jurisdictions and the status of the pleading standard in
their respective state as of publication of this Article. It also lists whether or not the state supreme
court has directly addressed the issue. If so, the case citation is included.
284. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 344 (Ariz. 2008).
285. See Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2016).
286. See Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531 (D.C. 2011).
287. See Bean v. Cummings, 939 A.2d 676 (Me. 2008).
288. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879 (Mass. 2008).
289. See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, NA, 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014).
290. See Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 285 P.3d 494 (Mont. 2012).
291. See Zamora v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 335 P.3d 1243 (N.M. 2014).
292. See DiLibero v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 108 A.3d 1013 (R.I. 2015).
293. See Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804 (S.D. 2008).
294. See Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011).
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Utah

Notice

No

America West Bank Members, L.C. v.
State 295

Vermont

Notice

No

n/a

Washington

Notice

Yes

McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB 296

West Virginia

Notice

No

n/a

Wyoming

Notice

No

n/a

Georgia

Notice

No

n/a

Kansas

Notice

No

n/a

North
Carolina

Notice

No

n/a

Oklahoma

Notice

No

n/a

Idaho

Notice

No

n/a

Mississippi

Notice

No

n/a

Nevada

Notice

Yes

Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 297

Statutory States

Affinity States

295.
296.
297.
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See Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, 342 P.3d 224 (Utah 2014).
See McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861 (Wash. 2010).
See Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 293 P.3d 869 (Nev. 2013).
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